I. INTRODUCTION
In January 2012, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Awad v. Ziriax upheld an injunction granted by the Western District of Oklahoma barring the implementation of Oklahoma's Save Our State Amendment, which "forb[ade] courts from considering or using Sharia" or international law.
1 Despite the decision in Awad, the Kansas Legislature passed a similar bill a few months later intended to ban Sharī'a law from "creeping" into the Kansas judiciary. 2 On May 21, 2012, Kansas Governor Sam Brownback signed into law Senate Bill 79, 3 codified at article 51 of the Kansas Statutes, concerning the protection of "rights and privileges granted under the United States or Kansas constitutions." 4 Article 51 plainly prohibits "any law, legal code or system of a jurisdiction outside of any state or territory of the United States." 5 And, under the law, "[a]ny court, arbitration, tribunal or administrative agency ruling or decision" basing a ruling "in whole or in part on any foreign law, legal code or system" is void and unenforceable as against the public policy of Kansas. 6 Article 51 bans the application of international law in state court proceedings. The law's language veils the true intent of article 51. Although not explicit in article 51, the legislative intent behind the law was to ban Sharī'a law, otherwise known as Islamic law.
The fear that international or Sharī'a law is infiltrating the American judicial system is not novel. Congress proposed several bills banning federal courts from considering foreign law from 2004 to 2009. 8 These measures have been driven largely by the fear that the judicial system is turning toward international law rather than the Constitution. 9 However, the cases that spurred this fear were controversial. 10 The Supreme Court has used foreign law "not because those norms are binding or controlling" but to ensure "respected reasoning to support" the Court's decision "with basic principles of decency." Some Americans have unjustly used the terms "Arab," "Muslim," and "terrorist" synonymously, and relied on pictures of veiled women, bearded men, and other false generalizations to demonize the Islamic faith. 13 During the 2012 Republican presidential primary, candidates Newt Gingrich and Michele Bachmann signed a pledge to fend off the "totalitarian control" of Islamic law.
14 David Yerushalmi, a New York lawyer, has initiated proposals in several states to ban Islamic law, attempting to use malleable state legislatures to pass anti-Muslim measures. has started two organizations-ACT! for America 16 and the Center for Security Policy 17 -to disseminate incorrect messages about Sharī'a law. 18 Indeed, the exact language used in article 51 is listed on the Center for Security Policy's website as an example for state legislatures to utilize during drafting. 19 This Note argues that article 51 is unconstitutional under the federal and state constitutions. While article 51 is not facially discriminatory, the intent to discriminate against the practice of Muslims is evident in the legislative history. Article 51 is unconstitutional under multiple clauses in the United States Constitution and section 7 of the Kansas Bill of Rights. Furthermore, this Note contends that article 51, with its broad and sweeping language, places an unnecessary burden on Kansas courts, citizens, and businesses.
Part II.A provides a brief introduction to Islamic law. Next, it explores the progression of Oklahoma's Save Our State Amendment, Awad, and article 51. Part III scrutinizes the legislative history and ultimate passage of article 51 in the Kansas Legislature and then examines its constitutionality. Part III.C discusses the impact of article 51 on existing Kansas laws and the resulting burdens on the state's citizens and businesses. Finally, Part III.D briefly addresses public policy concerns.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Sharī'a Law
The history of the life of the Prophet Muhammad, Peace Be Upon Him (PBUH), 20 20. In the Muslim faith, references to the Prophet Muhammad are generally followed with the phrase "Peace Be Upon Him"-shortened to "PBUH" in some texts. See, e.g., RAJ BHALA, UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW (SHARĪ'A), at xi (2011). For brevity's sake, and for respect of those reading, any references to the Prophet or Muhammad refer to the full respectful conveyance of the Prophet Muhammad, PBUH.
essence of the Islamic faith and where the tenants of the religion are encapsulated into the law of a particular state. 21 Thus, unlike the American legal system, the concept of separate, different religious faiths under a secular legal code does not exist in states under the Sharī'a.
22
Sharī'a law is considered a gift from God 23 and an instruction for his followers' daily lives. 24 Four sources comprise Islamic law: (1) the sacred text of Islam, the Holy Qur'an; (2) sunnah 25 -traditions, teachings, and practices of the Prophet Muhammad-including to some extent, hadiths; 26 (3) ijmā', or the consensus of the scholarly community; and (4) qiyās, which are analogical deductions and reasoning. The Qur'an and sunnah are the primary sources of Islamic law. 27 These two are intertwined primarily because of the meaning of the word Qur'an, "to recite." 28 God delivered his message-the Qur'an-to Muhammad through Jabreel (Gabriel), the Archangel.
29
Jabreel would instruct Muhammad to "recite!" and Muhammad, although frightened at first, repeated the message back.
30
Muhammad then recited the message to anyone who would listen, for many were skeptical of him being a "true" prophet of God. 57 Application of Larson provided a better analysis because the SOSA discriminated "among religions," in contrast with application of the Lemon standard, which examines whether the law provided a "uniform benefit to all religions." 58 SOSA's language singled out Sharī'a law and "the legal precepts of other nations and cultures." 59 The "domestic or Oklahoma culture," conversely, was protected. 60 However, both the specific mention of Sharī'a and the use of the word "other" discriminated among religions.
61 Thus, the court applied strict scrutiny. 62 The Lemon and Larson tests are more fully discussed below in Part III.A.
The court applied strict scrutiny, which requires that the state have a compelling interest and the law have a "close fit" with the state's interest. 63 Oklahoma could not identify "any actual problem" that SOSA sought to address. 64 Nor could Oklahoma provide "a single instance where an Oklahoma court had applied Sharī'a law or used the legal precepts of other nations or cultures, let alone that such applications or uses had caused problems in Oklahoma." 65 
C. Kansas's Article 51
More state legislatures are considering anti-Sharī'a measures. 67 The American Public Policy Alliance advocates these measures under the catchphrase "American Laws for American Courts" (ALAC), and has posted model legislation on its website. 68 The Florida ALAC provision-although not enacted-is almost identical to the model legislation and article 51. 69 The American Public Policy Alliance, ACT! For America, and Center for Security Policy all have pressured state legislatures to pass Sharī'a bans. 70 While this is reminiscent of the Federal Constitution Restoration Acts that Congress tried to pass early last decade, 71 article 51 passed and is now law. Momentum in Kansas to pass a law to effectively ban Sharī'a found a spokesperson in Representative Peggy Mast, a Republican from the town of Emporia. 72 Although not as explicit as SOSA, article 51 caused the same worry among Muslim groups when Governor Sam Brownback signed it into law on May 21, 2012. 73 The bill's stated purpose was to "protect and promote the rights and privileges" of the citizens of Kansas.
74 Any foreign law, legal code, or system that does not grant "the same fundamental liberties, rights and privileges granted under the United States and Kansas constitutions" is void and unenforceable under the law. 75 However, article 51 is inapplicable to legal business entities that contract with others and are subject to foreign choice-of-law provisions. 76 Thus, article 51 only applies to individuals exercising legal rights within the state of Kansas.
The word "Sharī'a" is not used in article 51, nor is there any mention of religion, unlike Oklahoma's SOSA. 77 But several legislators have stated that a statutory ban on Sharī'a law was the goal. 78 82 There is no mystery surrounding where the text of article 51 originated-the American Public Policy Alliance. The anti-Sharī'a purpose of the bill was how the group marketed the bill "all session long," and Senator Steineger " [has] all the e-mails to prove it." 83 
III. ANALYSIS
While the neutral language of article 51 seemingly may not affect a majority of citizens, it will affect Kansas Muslims wishing to have aspects of Sharī'a law incorporated into their marriage contracts or foreign divorce decrees. Further, the freedoms of individuals to use alternative dispute resolution, in particular arbitration, will be hindered. Businesses will be unable to utilize Sharī'a-compliant financial services. And most importantly, article 51 will preclude Kansas courts from understanding all aspects of certain cases when making a decision. test, or "endorsement test," to measure if the government conduct has the purpose or "the effect of conveying a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred." 93 
This modified
Lemon test further dictates that if the government's "actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion" the government's action is unconstitutional. 94 While "a legislature's stated reasons will generally get deference, the secular purpose required has to be genuine, not a sham, and not merely secondary to a religious objective."
95
Lemon is probably the appropriate test to apply to article 51 because its legislative purpose, although not its stated purpose, is to advance all religions except for Islam. 96 The true legislative intent of article 51 has been well documented in the press, 97 in emails between legislators, 98 and even in awards handed out to legislators.
99
Senator Mast nurtured the bill in the legislature and was its biggest supporter.
100 During a news conference about the bill, it appeared that Mast's motivation was to stem the harm caused by Islamic law.
101
Shortly after passing the bill, Senator Mast published a press release that gives contradictory explanations of the bill's purpose. 102 In one place, the press release states that due to the growing evidence and "concern regarding an active campaign to gain public acceptance to Sharia law . . .
[Mast] decided to act proactively in seeking legislation which would guarantee constitutional rights . . . ."
103 But, in the next paragraph, the press release states that the bill was not a "move against any religion . . . but actually a guarantee . . . they have the same protections as every other 93 Even if the government has an interest in regulating application of foreign law in Kansas courts, article 51 is not narrowly tailored to achieve this interest, but rather is "broadly written." 115 For instance, suppose a Muslim man sets up a will to incorporate principles of the Sharī'a with the intention to provide adequately for his daughter.
116
Article 51 would invalidate the will, leaving a grieving family to find a more "American" standard by which to distribute assets, even though to invalidate the will does nothing to further the government's purported interest of stemming harm caused by application of foreign law in Kansas courts. This indicates that article 51 is not narrowly tailored to achieve the government's interest.
B. Article 51's Constitutionality Under the Kansas Bill of Rights
Section 7 of the Kansas Bill of Rights provides that "nor shall any preference be given by law to any religious establishment or mode of worship."
117
The Kansas Constitution provides a greater amount of protection than the United States Constitution pertaining to the exercise of religious beliefs.
118 Kansas courts apply the following analysis to claims brought under the Kansas Constitution:
To determine whether government action violates an individual's right to religious freedom we ask: (1) whether the belief is sincerely held; (2) whether the state action burdens the exercise of religious beliefs; (3) whether the state interest is overriding or compelling; and (4) whether the state uses the least restrictive means.
119
The Plaintiff proves her case by proving the first two prongs of the inquiry, and then the burden switches to the government to prove that the last two prongs are satisfied. Certainly a petitioner who challenged article 51 would satisfy the first requirement of a sincerely held belief, as there is little doubt in the sincerity of the belief of Muslims. The second prong, whether the action burdens the exercise of religious beliefs, is discussed below in Part III.C, particularly regarding Islamic marriages, business and financial development, and arbitration. The more difficult part of the analysis is whether the state could prove that article 51 has a compelling interest and uses the least restrictive means. As stated above, several state senators were skeptical about the necessity of the law. And one Kansas court has called the act "superfluous." 124 The court notes "the judiciary [is] already charged with protecting constitutional rights."
125 The government cannot demonstrate a compelling interest because to do so it must show a necessity for the law. Article 51's purpose is to promote and protect guaranteed constitutional rights. 126 But if the judiciary is already charged with this task, there is no necessity for an additional law.
The state also cannot prove that article 51 uses the least restrictive means possible. Even if the government has an interest in regulating application of foreign law in Kansas courts, article 51 is not narrowly tailored to achieve this interest. 127 The law forbids application of "any law, legal code or system . . . outside any state or territory of the United States" in a court decision. 128 Further, any judgment entered by "any court" that relies on "any foreign law, legal code or system" that does not "protect and promote" the same rights found in the Kansas Constitution is invalid.
129
Contractual provisions that allow for a foreign law to govern disputes between parties invalidate the contract, or provision. 130 Such sweeping language that invalidates court judgments, arbitrations, and contracts based on a nonexhaustive list of guaranteed rights found in the Kansas and United States Constitutions cannot be the "least restrictive" means. 
C. Article 51's Impact on Islamic Practices and Traditions Within the United States and Kansas
Article 51's potential legal impact on common Islamic practices is significant. As already noted, Muslims incorporate the Sharī'a as a guide to how to live their everyday lives. 131 Article 51 unfairly impacts the way Muslims can incorporate the tenants of the Sharī'a into their marriages and in their personal and professional finances. Further, article 51 usurps federal law pertaining to Islamic arbitrations of business or financial disputes. The following examples illustrate the potential legal consequences of the law.
Marriage and Divorce
Generally, Kansas courts recognize as valid marriages contracted for outside of the state. 132 However, Kansas does not recognize marriages that violate the public policy of the state. 133 Under Sharī'a law, however, a marriage is a contract between the wife and husband. 134 It is an open question whether article 51's declaration that contracts based in whole or in part on foreign law "violate the public policy of this state" 135 invalidates foreign marriages.
It is also uncertain whether and to what extent a court would determine a marriage contract or contract between individuals is based on a "foreign law, legal code or system," 136 and then how fundamental liberties compare between the two legal systems. 137 To begin, a court would have to investigate and compare several constitutional provisions of the country where the foreign contract was made to determine the validity of the marriage. The court would then have to decide if that particular country's laws grant the same "fundamental liberties, rights and privileges granted under the United States and Kansas constitutions, including but not limited to, equal protection, due process, free exercise of religion, freedom of speech or press, and any right of privacy or 141 the deciding court must examine the laws of the foreign country to ensure the same rights granted to Kansas citizens are present in the foreign system. 142 Alternatively, the court could simply find that the country incorporates aspects of Islam into its laws and determine therefore that the marriage is invalid as a violation of public policy.
Kansas courts should be able to determine the validity of marriages regardless of whether foreign law is incorporated into the marriage contract. The Sixth Circuit examined an Islamic marriage in Hassan v. Holder, 143 in which a Muslim emigrated from Israel on a visa and had to prove his marriage status to obtain citizenship. 144 The court addressed whether a valid Islamic marriage occurred in Israel before the Muslim entered the country. 145 The evidence did not convince the court that a valid marriage occurred. 146 Rather, the court found that the "steps" required for a valid Islamic marriage were not satisfied. 147 Article 51 would prohibit a Kansas court from holding similarly. Any court decision that bases its decision, in whole or in part, on foreign law will be void and unenforceable. To complicate matters, the Kansas Constitution affords more protection to religious freedom than the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
151 Suppose a Kansas court, researching a foreign legal system, finds the foreign law grants religious freedoms tantamount to those granted by the United States' Constitution but not to those granted by the Kansas Constitution. What is the court to do? Certainly the language, "same fundamental . . . rights and privileges granted under the United States and Kansas constitutions" 152 seems to mandate that both constitutional thresholds must be met to satisfy the requirement of article 51. Further, the list is not exhaustive.
153
Suppose a case is decided correctly in a Kansas state district court utilizing a foreign legal code, then appealed to the Kansas Court of Appeals. The appealing party then points to a constitutional ruling in the foreign system that has yet to be decided in the United States Supreme Court and the Kansas Supreme Court. Do the "same privileges" granted under the United States and Kansas Constitutions have to perfectly match the foreign judgments? If a foreign law has a right to privacy that is interpreted by that jurisdiction as the right to assisted suicide, but which the Constitution of the United States precludes, 154 is the fact that there is a "fundamental liberty" or "right" of privacy-although not precisely the "same"-provided by the foreign jurisdiction enough to satisfy article 51's requirements? 155 There is no standard.
However, even if a court finds a marriage valid, Islamic women may still encounter legal hurdles. The Kansas Constitution states, "The legislature shall provide for the protection of the rights of women, in acquiring and possessing property, real, personal and mixed, separate and apart from the husband."
156 Women married in the Islamic tradition need assurance that their marriage contracts and divorces are valid and incorporate important principles of Sharī'a law so that a court will 155. My thanks to Professor Thomas Stacy for pointing out that the courts could emphasize the "fundamental liberty" found even though it may not be "the same fundamental liberty." 156. KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 6. [Vol. 61 adequately and fairly divide the property upon their divorce.
157
In Islam, it is an essential aspect of the contract to marriage that the husband gives the wife mahr, 158 a nuptial gift. This can be a substantial amount of money. 159 And the mahr remains with the wife regardless of divorce. 160 If a divorce does occur, the wife may use this money to support herself and pay for necessary expenses. 161 Because this is the wife's separate property, hers for as long as she lives, it should be treated as such in the divorce proceeding. 162 Article 51 was explored in a recent divorce case in Johnson County, Kansas. In Soleimani v. Soleimani, a man filed for divorce from his wife of two years who, after the marriage, emigrated from Iran. 163 The mahr agreement provided that she was to be paid an equivalent of $677,000. 164 However, the court lacked a valid English translation of the contract and therefore could only interpret it by incorporating Iranian and Islamic law. 165 The Soleimani court struggled to find a fair solution. The wife knew little English, lived in a shelter, did not have a job, and was ashamed to return to Iran. 166 Before marrying and signing the mahr agreement, the husband owned $7 million in assets. 167 Subsequently, during the divorce proceeding, he denied signing the agreement. 168 The court did not believe him. But because the court was precluded from interpreting the contract by applying Islamic law, which would grant the wife a substantial portion of the marital, it awarded the wife only temporary 157. See AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 137, at Sec. II.C (stating that banning laws of marriage and divorce from being used will prevent the court from deciding if there was evidence of a marriage or divorce at all).
158 Even if the contract were permitted to be interpreted, the court could not have honored the mahr agreement because of article 51.
170
The court's concern pertains to the fact that foreign jurisdictions, which enforce mahr agreements, do not separate church from state and allow for discrimination. 171 The court looked only to an Indian divorce case from an unpublished panel decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals for this information. 172 However, in a recent opinion from Connecticut, an Iranian mahr agreement was upheld based on "neutral principals of law" and found to be a valid contract.
173 If the Soleimani court did find a valid contract, it would be forced to invalidate it under article 51.
174
Courts should be permitted to consider neutral principals of law to determine if a valid contract is formed and to interpret its provisions.
175
Kansas courts should be especially aware of mahr when deciding divorces between Muslims. Other peculiarities in Sharī'a law might impact the decisions of Kansas family courts. Most notably, under Sharī'a, there is no martial property; all assets belong either to the wife or to the husband. 176 Second, a wife is entitled to maintenance, nafaka, during the marriage. 177 She is not required to provide any maintenance for her husband, nor is she required to give any of her earnings to him.
178
And the maintenance does not end at divorce-a husband is required to provide for his ex-wife and children, so long as the wife is not at fault. 
Business and Financial Development
Section 8 of article 51 exempts business entities from the prohibitions of article 51 if the entity contracts to subject itself to foreign law. 181 The freedom to negotiate with foreign businesses is a "critical" bargaining chip.
182 However, article 51 will hinder the development of Kansas businesses, particularly in the fields of finance and personal banking, regardless of the business exemption.
Article 51 inhibits the freedom to contract. 184 Under Sharī'a law, banks and other lenders are not allowed to charge interest-riba-on principal loaned. 185 Rather, a fee for the privilege of using the money for the loan is assessed on the principal, divided by the number of payments, and then added to the interval payment amount. 186 Typically, a business loan may be repaid by paying the principal of the loan and a percentage of profits over time. 187 With a successful business, a lending agent could make much more by assessing a fee on the profits collected rather than collecting interest on the loan amount. bank believes it could double its assets. 191 However, banks and financial transactions must be structured differently to capitalize on this trend. If a banking institution is to offer Sharī'a-compliant investments and financial services, it must satisfy several conditions. In addition to the general rules of corporate governance, a religious board-consisting mostly of Islamic scholarsmust scrutinize transactions, loans, and investments to ensure that these are in compliance with Sharī'a investment principles. 192 Typically, large lending agreements between an Islamic bank and a borrower are a sharikah al-mudarabah, a "sleeping partnership."
193 This is the classical way in which most large-scale purchases are financed under Sharī'a law for finance and business purposes. 194 Smaller, consumer purchases are contracted in a murabaha contract. 195 Under a murabaha contract, a bank and an individual enter into a "cost-plusprofit" agreement. 196 First, the bank buys the asset in its own name. 197 The bank then calculates its profit mark-up in agreement with the individual.
198
This represents the risk the bank undertakes in the transaction. 199 The consumer then purchases the asset at the cost-plus price as a fixed price or as scheduled payments. 200 While this transaction may seem unnecessary, it is essential under Islamic financing to avoid interest being paid. 201 A religious board within the bank reviews all transactions and contracts entered into by the bank to ensure Sharī'a law compliance. 202 If investment and lending practices are not Sharī'a law compliant, the banks could lose their Islamic banking credentials and business. 203 If Bank enters into a Sharī'a-compliant mortgage contract with A and A defaults on the mortgage, Bank would not have a valid contract. Section 4 of article 51 mandates that if a foreign legal code is "to govern some or all of the disputes between the parties," the contract is void and unenforceable. 204 And if the contract utilizes any foreign law that "includes or incorporates any substantive or procedural law . . . that would not grant the parties the same" constitutional rights Kansas citizens have, the contract is void. 205 Section 8 of article 51, the business exemption, is inapplicable in this instance. Business entities are exempt only if they are contracting to be subject to foreign law or courts outside the United States. 206 Here, Bank is subjecting itself to the location where the contracting took place: Kansas.
But an Islamic finance contract must adhere to the principles of Sharī'a, much like how a common law contract must pertain to lawful subject matter.
207
Article 51 would invalidate the mortgage contract described above because of the substantive aspects of Sharī'a law it incorporates.
Further, suppose that Corp-an Islamic company expanding into Kansas-wants to buy land and begin operations. If Bank offers Corp a Sharī'a-compliant loan, the amount of the loan will surely require Bank and Corp to enter into a sharikah al-mudarabah.
208 If Corp's account defaults, or Corp engages in practices that are not Sharī'a compliant, the contract is breached. 209 The Bank's religious board may then convene an arbitration panel to decide the dispute.
210
The board may apply a "mixture of national law and Shariah principles." 211 The problem now arises whether the sharikah al-mudarabah is a partnership subjected to foreign law. Arguably, this arrangement is a domestic agreement have a Sharī'a law advisory board that ensures included securities comply with certain Islamic financing standards. utilizing aspects of Sharī'a' law. This is similar to the hypothetical mortgage contract between A and Bank. The contract formed between Corp and Bank is also a domestic agreement. Bank is a corporation, but it is not subjecting itself to foreign laws or courts. Bank needs the application of Kansas's laws to exhaust its remedies to collect the debt. Article 51 would then void the contract under section 4 because terms of the mortgage and loan with Corp were Sharī'a based. And finally, complications arise because of the arbitration board utilized by Bank.
Arbitration Agreements and Provisions
Religious-based arbitration is not a novel concept. Islamiccompliant financial transactions often include an arbitration provision. 212 Frequently, courts within the United States have allowed arbitrations to proceed under religious rules such as the Rules of Procedure for Christian Conciliation, where disputing parties agree to mediate disputes guided by Holy Scriptures. 213 A Texas Court of Appeals found that state and federal law favor arbitration, even if the arbitration is before a Sharī'a tribunal. 214 Nevertheless, article 51 invalidates all contracts and financial agreements that allow for alternative dispute resolution because the business entity is allowing this provision to govern a dispute in the contract. 215 Legislating away Islamic arbitration provisions, agreements, or awards, is not a simple task. One complication is article 51's relationship with the United States Constitution's Supremacy Clause, which provides that the United States Constitution "shall be the supreme Law of the Land." 216 This includes treaties. 217 Article 51 bans "international law," which encompasses treaties made by the United States that are self-executing and directly applicable to state courts. 218 Kansas residents are not removed from international affairs or treaties. For example, the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) is an United States." 227 Indeed, while the New York Convention allows a public policy exception, the exception has been read "narrowly." 228 An arbitration award made pursuant to the New York Convention is enforceable regardless of article 51's provisions. Federal laws supersede state law, and when state and federal laws conflict, federal law prevails. 229 State laws that prohibit arbitration enforcement because of the use of foreign laws essentially "have the effect of managing relations with another country because foreign relations is the exclusive province of the federal government-specifically the President and Congress." 
D. Public Policy Issues
Article 51 raises some public policy concerns. Namely, Kansans and United States citizens have the right to contract freely, 231 and the Kansas courts should have free and full discretion when deciding a case. Kansas courts have recognized the public policy right to contract freely. 232 And this right should not be interfered with "lightly." 233 Article 51 states that the right to contract can be circumvented when there is a "state[] interest to protect and promote rights and privileges" of the U.S. and Kansas Constitutions. 234 Senator Marci Francisco stated that she believed this provision to be unfair, and that article 51 provided corporations a greater freedom to contract than individuals. 235 It is unjust for courts to be permitted to interpret contracts incorporating foreign law for businesses but not for individuals. Courts should be available to people first, not business entities. Individuals are able to protect and promote their own rights-a business entity is no more intelligent, and no less vulnerable.
Several experts in Islamic and international law have signaled warnings about article 51's potential impact. 236 The most notable [Vol. 61 warning is American Bar Association Resolution 113A. 237 The report cited two main concerns: (1) the ALAC acts have enormous constitutional concerns, and (2) the U.S. Constitution already protects individual rights and freedoms. 238 While article 51 does not explicitly name Sharī'a law, the intent behind the law is evident. Foreign countries will not want to negotiate or enter into contracts with Kansas companies. Though it could be argued that article 51 does not extend to business entities, foreign businesses do not have to do more than a simple Internet search to find the intent of the law and decide not to transact business in a discriminatory state. Those entities might further discover that legislators have urged that although article 51 does not apply to Sharī'a law per se, it does pertain to international law. Or, if a close business relationship is forged in the wake of article 51, the parties might be hesitant to bring foreign-domiciled workers to Kansas. As discussed, companies might worry that an employee's marriage, divorce agreements, or other contracts might be invalidated if challenged.
239
The United States Constitution is not in danger of losing its ability to protect the citizens of the United States. There is no need for article 51 and ALAC provisions. Article 51 questions the integrity of the Kansas courts and instructs judges about what is appropriate law. 240 Article 51 dictates "the scope of [judges'] enforcement powers . . . [and] their ability to consider in their deliberations" certain laws and "potentially informative sources in order to reach the best outcomes in the cases before them." 241 Courts already will not follow a choice-of-law provision if it will violate the state or federal public policy. 242 And in several cases dealing with aspects of Sharī'a law, courts have declined to apply the decision of foreign courts because of violations to public policy. 243 It seems that the Kansas Legislature does not trust state courts to construe fair rulings, to find out what is equitable, or to follow provisions the parties agreed to in a contract.
IV. CONCLUSION
Certainly, after the attacks of September 11, 2001, Americans felt a deep-rooted sense of patriotism emerge. Alongside this, Americans also felt a fear of the unknown. This fear has spurred wide instances of Islamophobia throughout the country. 244 While the Kansas Legislature may have felt threatened by radical Islamic terrorists or influence from Islamic culture when it passed article 51, such fears do not justify passing a bill that has such far-reaching potential to undermine the daily lives of Americans-regardless if they are Muslim or not. The law's broad and expansive language could have far more unintended consequences than were within the scope of this Note. 
